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Abstract
There are two ways of reading Newman’s objection to Russell’s struc-
turalism. One assumes that according to Russell, our knowledge of a the-
ory about the external world is captured by an existential generalization on
all non-logical symbols of the theory. Under this reading, our knowledge
amounts to a cardinality claim. Another reading assumes that our knowl-
edge singles out a structure in Russell’s (and Newman’s) sense: a model the-
oretic structure that is determined up to isomorphism. Under this reading,
our knowledge is far from trivial, for it amounts to knowledge of the struc-
ture of the relations between objects, but not their identity. Newman’s ob-
jection is then but an expression of structural realism. Since therefore the
content of theories is described by classes of structures closed under iso-
morphism, the most natural description of a theory in structural realism is
syntactic.
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1 Introduction
Structural realism (sr) is often considered tantalizingly close to being a perfect
example of philosophical synthesis: As Putnam (1975b, 73) demands, it doesn’t
render the success of the sciences a miracle. At the same time, it heeds the re-
sult of the pessimistic meta-induction developed by Laudan (1981) and does not
commit to the existence of the objects named in successful theories. sr is im-
portantly related or even central to the philosophies of, among others, Kant
(Ladyman 2014, §3.1), Duhem, Poincaré, Carnap, and Russell (Gower 2000) and
it has been suggested as the true ontology of modern physics (Ladyman 2014,
§4.1). Its beauty and clearness is at present mainly obscured by two clouds. First,
it is not quite clear what is meant by ‘structure’, and thus not quite clear what
sr is being realist about. Second, to the extent that the meaning of ‘structure’ is
clear, it seems that claims about structure can only entail trivial claims about the
world. The latter cloud has cast a shadow over sr at least since Newman (1928)
argued that Russell’s causal theory of perception (Russell 1927) is trivial.
In the following, I want to disperse both clouds at once by identifying two
ways of reading Newman’s objection. The first makes the popular assumption
that a theory’s structure is given by an existential generalization on non-logical
symbols of the theory. I will argue that existential generalizations cannot possi-
bly describe the structure of a theory, however, and that in that sense, Newman’s
objection is dead (§3). The second reading is based on the notion of isomorphism.
It fits better with Russell’s and Newman’s notion of structure and entails that
Newman’s objection is no trivialization of sr, but a compact description of its
very point (§4). Thus Newman’s objection is very much alive as the cornerstone
of a precise, non-trivial account of sr.
2
Sebastian Lutz Newman’s Objection is Dead; Long Live Newman’s Objection!—Preprint
The second reading of Newman’s objection leads to a description of the struc-
tures of sr by classes of model theoretic structures, and these classes have com-
pact syntactic descriptions. Then, surprisingly, one disambiguation of Russell’s
theory of perception leads to a sr that is identical to the semantics of scientific
theories according to the logical empiricists (§5).
While I provide a provably non-trivial formulation of sr and thus a defense
of the position, I will provide no further positive justification. I will but muse a
little upon the implications of the results of this paper for such a justification and
also upon the relation of sr to the inscrutability of reference and the adverbial
theory of perception (§6).
2 Prologue: How We Got Here
sr can be seen as one of the two straightforward intermediate positions between
realism and antirealism about scientific theories.1 The realist position may have
its strongest intuitive support in the no-miracles argument, described by Putnam
(1975a, 73) as follows:
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy
that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle. That terms in
mature scientific theories typically refer [ . . . ], that the theories ac-
cepted in a mature science are typically approximately true [ . . . ]—
these statements are viewed by the scientific realist not as necessary
truths but as part of the only scientific explanation of the success of
science, and hence as part of any adequate scientific description of
science and its relations to its objects.
Putnam’s argument relies on an inference to the best explanation, specifically an
inference to the only explanation. Whether this is a valid inference scheme is
controversial, but, as Laudan (1981, 24) points out, this is not the only problem
with Putnam’s argument:
Are genuinely referential theories (i. e., theories whose central terms
genuinely refer) invariably or even generally successful at the em-
pirical level [ . . . ]? There is ample evidence that they are not. The
chemical atomic theory in the 18th century was so remarkably un-
successful that most chemists abandoned it[.]
So it seems that the central premise of Putnam’s inference to the best explanation
is false, as there is no explanation to be had from the reference of scientific terms.
For if many theories with referring terms are unsuccessful, there is no reason to
expect yet another theory with referring terms to be successful, and hence this
assumption cannot provide an explanation of the success of such a theory. But
1. The complementary intermediate position would be entity realism (Hacking 1983, 29).
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even leaving the question of the explanatory power of genuine reference and the
validity of inferences to the best explanation aside, the conclusion of Putnam’s
argument, that the terms of successful theories are likely to refer, is false (Laudan
1981, 27):
What we are confronted by in 19th-century aether theories, then, is a
wide variety of once successful theories, whose central explanatory
concept Putnam singles out as a prime example of a non-referring
one[.]
One of these aether theories, Fresnel’s theory of light, is so successful that its
equations for the relative intensity of reflected and refracted light beams are still
being used. But as Worrall (1989, 117) argues, following Poincaré, not everything
about Fresnel’s theory should be considered false:
There was an important element of continuity in the shift from Fres-
nel to Maxwell—and this was much more than a simple question of
carrying over the successful empirical content into the new theory.
At the same time it was rather less than a carrying over of the full
theoretical content or full theoretical mechanisms (even in “approx-
imate” form). [ . . . ] There was continuity or accumulation in the
shift, but the continuity is one of form or structure, not of content.
This observation leadsWorrall to what has been called epistemic structural realism
(esr). “This holds that it is reasonable to believe that our successful theories are
(approximately) structurally correct (and also that this is the strongest epistemic
claim about them that it is reasonable to make)” (Worrall 2007, 125).
Worrall assumes that the success of theories is their empirical success (cf.
Worrall 2007, 126), and that as far as the empirical implications are concerned,
we can know that successful theories are literally true, that is, both regarding
their structure and the referents of their terms. Of the non-empirical, theoretical
implications, however, we can only ever know that they are structurally correct,
whence this position may be called theoretical esr. Complete esr is accordingly
the claim that of a theory as a whole, both with respect to their empirical and
theoretical implications, we can only know that it is structurally correct.
A natural question to ask about esr is whywe can only know the structure of
(the theoretical part of) the world. One possible answer is given by ontic struc-
tural realism (osr): We cannot know the objects that instantiate the structure
of the world because there are no such objects. This position is suggested by La-
dyman (1998). Since there are two versions of esr, there are also two different
versions of osr, each providing an explanation for one of the two version of esr.
Given these two distinctions between theoretical and complete sr and be-
tween ontic and epistemic sr, there are four kinds of sr:
Definition 1. Complete osr (complete esr) is the claim that all there is to (all we
can know about) the world is its structure*.
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Definition 2. Theoretical osr (theoretical esr) is the claim that all there is to (all
we can know about) the world is its structure* and observable objects with their
observational properties.
However, for each of these four kinds of sr, these are definitions obscurum per
obscurius unless the notion of ‘structure*’ is given—hence the asterisk, which I
will drop until §4. Demopoulos and Friedman (1985, 624) provide such a notion
after identifying an early account of theoretical esr, Russell’s Analysis of Matter
(1927):
[O]n Russell’s “structuralism” or “structural realism”, of “percepts”
we know both their quality and structure [ . . . ], while of external
events we know only their structure.
Percepts are observations, and thus are described by the empirical implications
of theories. The external events, or “stimuli”, in Russell’s terminology, are what
I have been calling theoretical. Demopoulos and Friedman (1985, 622) then ar-
gue for a specific formal account of Russell’s theoretical esr: “Russell in 1927
is prepared to accept the Ramsey-sentence [ . . . ] as the proper statement of our
scientific knowledge.”
If our scientific knowledge described in a scientific theory is given by a single
sentence ϑ of predicate logic, the theory’s Ramsey sentence RO (ϑ) is obtained
by generalizing on all theoretical terms that occur in ϑ. More precisely, assume
that the vocabulary V of the language in which ϑ is formulated is bipartitioned
into an observational vocabulary O and a theoretical vocabulary T . Since ϑ is a
single sentence, it contains at most finitely many observation termsO1, . . . ,Om ∈O and finitely many theoretical terms T1,T2, . . . ,Tn ∈ T . In a slight abuse of
notation, ϑ can then be written as ϑ(O1, . . . ,Om ,T1, . . . ,Tn).2 The existential
generalization on all theoretical terms then leads to the Ramsey sentence of ϑ,
RO (ϑ) = ∃X1 . . .Xnϑ(O1, . . . ,Om ,X1, . . . ,Xn) , (1)
which contains only observational terms (whence the subscript ‘O ’). For the
Ramsey sentence to be an explication of theoretical sr, one has to assume that
the extensions of all terms in ϑ are fixed in this world by what one could call an
‘intended structure’. The existential generalization then replaces the theoretical
terms by variables, which have no fixed interpretation.
With theoretical esr explicated by the Ramsey sentence, Demopoulos and
Friedman (1985) further assume that the world is given by some model theoretic
structure and that ϑ is formulated in first order logic. Then, they point out,
theoretical sr is trivial in that the most it can state about the theoretical world is
the cardinality of its domain, nothing more. For if all observational implications
2. More precisely: One can introduce a higher order m + n-place formula ϑ∗ such that
ϑ∗(O1, . . . ,Om ,T1, . . . ,Tm)  ϑ. The identification of ϑ and ϑ∗ will not lead to any confusion in
the following.
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of ϑ are true in a structure, then RO (ϑ) is true in an elementary extension of that
structure as well (Demopoulos 2011, 186).3 Demopoulos and Friedman (1985,
635) conclude:
Newman’s problem can be put this way. [The Ramsey sentence pro-
cedure] threatens to turn the empirical claims of science into mere
mathematical truths. More precisely, if our theory is consistent, and
if all its purely observational consequences are true, then the truth
of the Ramsey-sentence follows as a theorem of set theory or second-
order logic, provided our initial domain has the right cardinality[.]
In short, theoretical esr does not describe the theoretical world at all.
There have been a number of suggested responses to this trivialization result,
none of which save the Ramsey sentence approach (Ainsworth 2009). They ei-
ther accept the trivialization result, abandon the Ramsey sentence approach, or
modify the semantics of the existential generalization in higher order logic. Since
changes to the semantics also change the logic, the latter kind of responses im-
plicitly also abandon the Ramsey sentence approach: They describe theoretical
esr with the help of something that looks like the Ramsey sentence of higher or-
der logic but which is in fact some formula in a different (and typically woefully
under-specified) logic, and thus has different content.
3 Newman’s Objection is Dead
Newman’s objection applies both to theoretical esr and theoretical osr: In the
case of esr, its conclusion states that all we can know about the theoretical world
is the number of not further distinguishable objects it contains. Its conclusion is
even more dire for osr, because it states that all there is in the (theoretical) world
is a specific number of not further distinguished objects. Since this conclusion
entails that there is specifically no structure to the set of objects, it is the exact
opposite of osr, which is intended to express that there is structure but there are
no objects. If sound, Newman’s objection is thus devastating for sr. I will argue
that Newman’s objection as developed by Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) is
not sound. Specifically, I want to show that the explication of ‘structure’ by
existential generalization is inadequate.
3.1 Ramsey Sentences
For Worrall, maybe the main proponent of this approach, the Ramsey sentence
expresses the claim that there are properties that stand in a specific logical re-
lation to each other, and he takes this claim to have a non-trivial ontological
import. For “if we follow Quine’s dictum that ‘to be is to be quantified over’
[ . . . ] then the Ramsey sentence [ . . . ] clearly asserts that the ‘natural kinds’
3. See Shoenfield (1967, §5, ex. 9.a). Tuomela (1973, theorem iii.3) gives a proof.
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[X1, . . . ,Xn ] exist in reality just as realists want to say” (Worrall 2007, 152). And
this “is just a second-order mirroring of Quine 1961 on ontological commitment”
(Worrall 2011, 170). But the Ramsey sentence can assert no such thing if De-
mopoulos and Friedman (1985) are correct in their criticism of the Ramsey sen-
tence. That they are correct becomes clear when considering deductions that are
sanctioned in higher order logic (independently of any semantic assumptions).
Here is an example of a Ramsey sentence whose existence claim for alleged natu-
ral kinds disappears:
RO
 ∀x(O1x→ T1x)∧ (T1x→O2x) (2)
a`∃X1∀x[(O1x→X1x)∧ (X1x→O2x) (3)
a`∀x[O1x→O2x] (4)
a`RO
 ∀x[O1x→O2x] . (5)
Stated informally: The Ramsey sentence of a theory that states that T1 mediates
between O1 and O2 is equivalent to the statement that everything that is O1 is
also O2. For instance, the claim that everyone who is hugged becomes happy
and everyone who becomes happy starts smiling turns into the simple statement
that everyone who is hugged starts smiling (assuming that ‘becoming happy’
is the sole theoretical term). Thus the Ramsey sentence does not describe the
structural relation of the theoretical term to the observation terms; the Ramsey
sentence simply eliminates the theoretical term. Conversely, a simple cardinality
condition suffices for introducing non-trivially related variables for theoretical
terms into the Ramsey sentence of a theory that itself contains no theoretical
terms at all:
RO
 ∀x(O1x→O2x)∧∃≥6x(¬O1x ∧O2x) (6)
` ∃X1 . . .X7∀x

(O1x→X1x)∧ (X1x→X2x)∧ · · · ∧ (X7x→O2x)
∧∧
i< j
Xi 6=X j
 (7)
` RO
 ∀x(O1x→ T1x)∧ (T1x→ T2x)∧ · · · ∧ (T7x→O2x)
∧∧
i< j
Ti 6= T j

.
(8)
Thus Newman’s objection (in Demopoulos and Friedman’s guise) can just be
rephrased: If the Ramsey sentence were to express that the natural kinds exist in
reality, then the existence of the natural kinds would follow from the truth of
the theory’s empirical claims and a cardinality constraint.
So much for the syntactic argument. What exactly is going wrong with the
Ramsey sentence approach to theoretical sr becomes obvious when considering
the semantics of the Ramsey sentence. It is a basic theorem of model theory that
the truth value of a sentence depends only on the domain and the interpretation
of the terms that appear in the sentence. If this theorem did not hold, an inter-
pretation of a sentence would require an explicit assignment of extensions to all
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terms in the vocabulary of the language. Instead, for a sentence ϑ containing the
terms O1, . . . ,Om ,T1, . . . ,Tn , the structure
A= 〈dom (A) ,OA1 , . . . ,OAm ,T A1 , . . . ,T An 〉 (9)
already determines ϑ’s truth value, even if O and T contain more terms than
O1, . . . ,Om and T1, . . . ,Tn , respectively. Call a structure that interprets all and
only the terms that occur in a sentence aminimal structure of that sentence, and a
minimal structure in which the sentence is true aminimal model of that sentence.
It is clear that a sentence ϑ only restricts the interpretation of the terms in its
minimal models, for expanding a minimal model of ϑ so that it interprets terms
not in ϑ will result again in a model of ϑ. Now consider ϑ’s Ramsey sentence
RO (ϑ). Its minimal structures and models have the form
A= 〈dom (A) ,OA1 , . . . ,OAm〉 , (10)
which makes it obvious that RO (ϑ) restricts only the interpretation of observa-
tion terms. This is more precisely expressed by
Claim 1. For every V -structure A, A  RO (ϑ) if and only if A|O  RO (ϑ).
Proof. Since RO (ϑ) contains only O -terms, its truth-value in A is only deter-
mined by the domain and the interpretation of the O -terms, that is, A|O .
A|O here is the reduct of A: The structure that results from A by restricting
its interpretation to the terms in O . Thus the Ramsey sentence cannot possibly
determine the structure of the referents of theoretical terms, because it deter-
mines nothing about them. This follows directly from claim 1:
Corollary 2. For any two V -structures A and B with A|O =B|O , A  RO (ϑ) if
and only ifB  RO (ϑ)
Proof. A  RO (ϑ) if and only if A|O  RO (ϑ) if and only if B|O  RO (ϑ) if and
only ifB  RO (ϑ).
It is for this reason that the use of the Ramsey sentence for the description
of theoretical sr is misguided in its very core assumptions, and that Newman’s
objection as reported by Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) is no threat to esr.
Or, for that matter, to osr.
3.2 Newman Sentences
Besides not being a threat to theoretical sr, Newman’s objection as reported
by Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) is also not the objection that Newman
(1928) actually levels against Russell’s theory of perception. Newman (1928, 144)
proceeds from two passages of Russell’s. In the first, Russell (1927, 254) concludes
what we can infer from perceptions:
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Thus it would seem that wherever we infer from perceptions it is
only structure that we can validly infer; and structure is what can be
expressed by mathematical logic.
In the second passage, Russell (1927, 270–71) applies this conclusion to our
knowledge of the stimuli—the external, physical world—as inferred from our
perceptions:
The only legitimate attitude about the physical world seems to be
one of complete agnosticism as regards all but its mathematical prop-
erties.
Newman (1928, 142) summarizes Russell’s position as follows:
Briefly: of the external world we know its structure and nothing
more.
In this version of sr, there is then no mention of any relation between the obser-
vational objects (the percepts) and the theoretical objects (the stimuli). Rather,
of the theoretical objects only their structure is known. Thus this position of
Russell’s amounts to complete esr. Note, however, that we do know observable
objects directly. It is just that they do not play a role in our knowledge of the
unobservable objects beyond determining the structure of the unobservable ob-
jects.
At the core of Newman’s objection to Russell’s esr (140) is his observation
that
no important information about the aggregate A, except its cardinal
number, is contained in the statement that there exists a system of
relations, with A as field, whose structure is an assigned one.
Thus Newman is considering a description of the stimuli given by a sentence
τ(T1, . . . ,Tn) containing only theoretical terms and treats as its structure the
sentence ∃X1 . . .Xnτ(X1, . . . ,Xn), which contains no terms at all. In the con-
temporary discussion, it is usually assumed that one is dealing with a theory
ϑ(O1, . . . ,Om ,T1, . . . ,Tn) that contains both theoretical and observation terms
(see Worrall 2007, 3(c)), but one nonetheless existentially generalizes on all terms
in ϑ. This leads to what could be called ϑ’s Newman sentence4
R∅(ϑ) = ∃X1 . . .Xm+nϑ(X1, . . . ,Xm+n) (11)
Newman’s objection applies independently from any assumptions about which
terms occur in the theory, as long as one generalizes on all of them. In model
theoretic terminology, Newman assumes that there is some domainA, and points
out that the truth of the Newman sentence at best determines its cardinality. This
near-triviality of the Newman sentence follows immediately from claim 1:
4. I thank F.A. Muller for this moniker.
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Corollary 3. For any two V -structures A and B with dom (A) = dom (B), A 
R∅(ϑ) if and only ifB  R∅(ϑ)
Proof. In claim 1, choose O =∅. The corollary follows becauseA|∅ = dom (A) =
dom (B) =B|∅.
Thus the Newman sentence is true if and only if the domain of the theory
has the right cardinality. But this result is as unsurprising as the analogous result
about the Ramsey sentence: Since the minimal model of a Newman sentence
is a structure with a domain but no interpretation of any terms, the Newman
sentence does not determine anything but the cardinality of its domain. Together
with the domain of the theory, the theory’s Newman sentence thus expresses
not sr, but rather its complement entity realism: The entities described in the
theory are real, but their properties are unknown or do not exist. On its own,
the Newman sentence cannot even determine the objects in the domain, since
any structure with a domain of the right cardinality is a model of the Newman
sentence:
Corollary 4. For any two V -structures A and B with |dom (A)| = |dom (B)|,
A  R∅(ϑ) if and only ifB  R∅(ϑ).
Proof. If |dom (A)| = |dom (B)|, there is a bijection from dom (A) to dom (B).
By the bijection lemma 7 below, there is then a structure C with dom (C) =
dom (B) that is isomorphic to A. Therefore A  R∅(ϑ) if and only if C  R∅(ϑ)
according to the isomorphism theorem. Since dom (C) = dom (B), C  R∅(ϑ) if
and only ifB  R∅(ϑ) by corollary 3.
The conclusion of Newman’s original objection is that the Newman sentence
of a theory is true if the domain of the theory has the right cardinality. But as
corollary 3 shows, the Newman sentence does not contain any structural infor-
mation. Therefore the only moral that one can draw from Newman’s objection
is the following: If one does not have any structural information, then one has
no information. This is obviously compatible with the view that structural infor-
mation is the only information that counts. The conclusion of the contemporary
version of Newman’s objection is that the Ramsey sentence of a theory is true
if the domain of the theory has the right cardinality and the theory’s observable
implications are true. But as corollary 1 shows, the Newman sentence does not
contain any theoretical structural information. Therefore the only moral that
one can draw from this version of Newman’s objection is the following: If one
does not have any theoretical structural information, then one has no theoretical
information. This is obviously compatible with the view that theoretical struc-
tural information is the only theoretical information that counts.
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4 Long Live Newman’s Objection!
When based on existential generalization, Newman’s objection applies to a posi-
tion that is not sr (neither theoretical nor complete). Thus Newman’s objection
to sr fails. Put in a slightly different way, Newman’s objection is a symptom
of the incorrect explication of sr by existential generalization. The challenge
is then to find a different explication of sr that does not fall prey to an analo-
gous objection. As already intimated, Russell and Newman’s original exchange
already contains a different, much more plausible explication, and I will show in
the following that this explication is not trivial and thus cannot fall prey to an
analogue of Newman’s objection. The explication of sr is based on model theo-
retic notions, but does not identify the notion of structure* needed for sr with
the model theoretic notion of structure. Hence in the following I will use the
term ‘abstract structure’ and suggest that it should play the role of structure* in
sr.
4.1 Isomorphic Structures
Newman’s objection is based on passages in which Russell claims that, as New-
man (1928, 142) puts it, “of the external world we know its structure and nothing
more”. But even Newman’s own paraphrase of Russell’s position does not ascribe
to Russell solely the claim that there exists a system of relations on the external
stimuli. Rather, it ascribes to Russell the claim that the stimuli have some spe-
cific structure*. In the early days of logic, the two descriptions may have seemed
synonymous (cf. Hodges 2001, 2), but in current model theory, their distinc-
tion makes all the difference. That the structure* claim leads to something very
different from existential generalizations is clear when considering Newman’s
exposition of Russell’s concept of structure* (Newman 1928, 139):
For our purpose it is not necessary to define the single word “struc-
ture” but only what is meant by the statement that “two systems of
relations have the same structure”. Let a set, A, of objects be given,
and a relation R which holds between certain subsets of A. Let B be
a second set of objects, also provided with a relation S which holds
between certain subsets of its members. The two systems are said to
have the same structure if a (1, 1) correlation can be set up between
the members of A and those of B such that if two members of A have
the relation R their correlates have the relation S, and vice versa.
Newman here describes two structures (in the modern sense of the term) that are
isomorphic (cf. Russell 1927, 249–50; 1919, 60–61). I will say that each structure
is a representative of an equivalence class of structures that have the same abstract
structure.
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Definition 3 (Russell, Newman). Two structures have the same abstract struc-
ture if and only if they are isomorphic. An abstract structure is described by an
equivalence class of isomorphic structures.5
And since the notion of structure* that Russell and Newman assume is ab-
stract structure, their accounts of theoretical and complete structural realism
should rely on abstract structures as well. Indeed, I suggest to consider the struc-
tures* in all kinds of sr abstract structures:
Definition 4. A structure* is an abstract structure.
The following then holds:
Claim 5. According to theoretical esr, our knowledge of the world given by structure
A and our knowledge of the world given by structureB is the same if and only if A
andB are isomorphic.
Proof. From definitions 1, 3, and 4.
Isomorphism is a clearly semantic notion, and has nothing to do with an
existential generalization on non-logical symbols. This already indicates that the
trivialization argument that works against the Ramsey and the Newman sen-
tences will not work against sr when ‘structure*’ is explicated by abstract struc-
ture. The explication of complete esr by way of the Newman sentence is trivial
in that it can at the most distinguish between structures with domains of differ-
ent cardinalities. The explication of complete esr by way of isomorphism is not
trivial in this sense, simply because two structures being isomorphic is a much
stronger condition than their domains having the same cardinality. Specifically,
the following holds:
Claim 6. There are structures A, B with dom (A) = dom (B) (and hence
|dom (A)|= |dom (B)|) that are not isomorphic.
Proof. 〈{1,2},{1}〉 and 〈{1,2},{1},{2}〉 are not isomorphic.
What, then, does Newman’s objection amount to? He phrases his criticism
as follows (Newman 1928, 144):
Any collection of things can be organised so as to have the structure
W, provided there are the right number of them. Hence the doctrine
that only structure is known involves the doctrine that nothing can
be known that is not logically deducible from the mere fact of exis-
tence, except (“theoretically”) the number of constituting objects.
5. The (proper) class of isomorphic structures is at the most as problematic as the class of
models of a set of sentences. Linnebo and Pettigrew (2014, 274) discuss the subtleties involved. I
thank Sten Lindström for inquiring about this.
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The second sentence applies to complete sr explicated by the Newman sentence,
but it does not follow from the first, which applies to complete sr explicated by
isomorphism. This first sentences follows from
Claim 7 (Bijection lemma). For any structure A and any set B with a bijection
b : dom (A) −→ B , there is a structure B with dom (B) = B such that b is an
isomorphism from A toB.
Proof. Let A = 〈A,R1, . . . ,Rr , f1, . . . fs , c1, . . . , ct 〉. For each function fi define
b ( fi ) = b ◦ fi ◦ b−1. For each k-ary relation Ri and any k-tuple 〈x1, . . . xk〉
of objects of the appropriate types on A, define b (Ri )
 
b (x1), . . . , b (xk )
 ⇔
Ri (x1, . . . , xk ). It follows by induction on the order of types that b : A −→ B
is an isomorphism from A to B = 〈B , b (R1), . . . , b (Rr ), b ( f1), . . . , b ( fs ),
b (c1), . . . , b (ct )〉.
Newman’s objection follows as
Corollary 8. For any structure A and any set B with the same cardinality as
dom (A), there is a structure B with dom (B) = B that has the same abstract
structure as A.
Proof. If dom (A) and B have the same cardinality, there is a bijection from
dom (A) to B . The corollary follows from the bijection lemma and definition 3.
Since abstract structures are not trivial, Newman’s objection does not triv-
ialize complete sr. It rather expresses that the identity of an abstract structure
is independent of the objects occurring in any of its representatives. This is ex-
pressed by another, trivial corollary of the bijection lemma:
Corollary 9. Any object of a structure’s domain dom (A) can be switched with any
other object (not necessarily in dom (A)) without changing the abstract structure that
A represents.
In other words, if only the abstract structure is known, then no specific ob-
ject is known. Thus if, as complete esr claims, we can only know the abstract
structure of the world, then we can know something non-trivial about the world
but not what objects reside in it. Thus Newman’s observation is no objection to
complete esr, but rather a paraphrase of its very point.
It might seem that while abstract structures can express complete esr, they
are unable to express complete osr. For even thought an abstract structure does
not determine a specific set of objects, it still seems to express that there is some
set of objects. But this impression stems from an interpretation of equivalence
classes that is not necessary and not even in line with how equivalence classes are
often interpreted in the sciences. There can be different reasons why the objects
in abstract structures are not relevant: because we do not have access to them
or because they do not exist. In the sciences, an equivalence class is very often
13
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interpreted in the second sense. Temperature measurements are identified if they
only differ in their scale, because the numerical value does not correspond to
anything in the world. In Newtonian mechanics, descriptions that differ only in
their origin, orientation, or constant relative motion are taken to describe the
same system because there are neither an absolute origin nor absolute orienta-
tions nor absolute velocities. Thus in the sciences equivalence classes are often
used to avoid commitment to those referents that do not occur in all represen-
tatives of the equivalence class. In this sense, one can coherently state that some
system is completely described by an equivalence class, for the assumption is
that the system only contains whatever is shared by all representatives of the
equivalence class. This is, for instance, how manifolds are described in differen-
tial geometry (and thus in general relativity): A manifold is a specific topology
together with a specific equivalence class of atlases (sets of local coordinate sys-
tems on the topology); new concepts can only be defined relative to the whole
equivalence class of atlases, not relative to a specific representative of the equiv-
alence class (a specific atlas). The reason is that the features that are not shared
between all atlases are not considered real, but only artifacts of the specific choice
of atlas.
Thus the difference between esr and osr lies in the different interpretation of
abstract structures, but not in a different formalization. Therefore the following
holds:
Claim 10. According to complete osr, two structures A and B represent the same
description of the world if and only A andB are isomorphic.
Proof. From definitions 1, 3, and 4.
‘To represent’ here has its technical meaning ‘being a representative of’, since
two structures represent the same equivalence class if and only if they are isomor-
phic.
4.2 Isomorphic Structures with Identical Observable Objects
Expressing theoretical sr in terms of abstract structures requires a decision on
how observable objects are to be delineated. In one major approach that fits with
the model theoretic notion of ‘structure’, to know the observational objectsO in
a structure A is to know the substructure A|O of A that has the domainO (e. g.,
van Fraassen 1980, 64). Understood literally, this approach has the awkward im-
plication that knowing an observational object entails knowing all its properties,
including highly theoretical ones like its chemical and subatomic composition
(Lutz 2014a, 3206). It also does not express theoretical sr as given by definition 2,
which only demands that the observational properties of observable objects are
known. An appropriate generalization of the substructure approach is given by
Definition 5. The observable objectsO and their observable properties (named
by O ) in a structure A are described by the structure’s relativized reduct A|OO .
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A|OO is the substructure (with domainO) of the reduct of A to the observa-
tion terms O : A|OO =A|O |O.6 This definition leads to
Claim 11. According to theoretical esr, for observable objects O and observational
terms O , our knowledge of the world given by structure A and our knowledge of the
world given by structure B is the same if and only if A and B are isomorphic and
A|OO =B|OO .
Proof. From definitions 1, 3, 4, and 5.
For theoretical osr, the definition leads to
Claim 12. According to theoretical osr, for observable objectsO and observational
terms O , two structures A andB represent the same description of the world if and
only A andB are isomorphic and A|OO =B|OO .
Proof. From definitions 1, 3, 4, and 5.
According to claims 11 and 12, theoretical osr and theoretical esr are not
trivial, that is, do not include all structures. The reason is that abstract structures
already allow for the exclusion of some structures and the demand for the iden-
tity of the relativized reducts allows for the exclusion of even more. Claims 11
and 12 therefore show that theoretical sr (definition 2) is non-trivially explicated
by the definitions of abstract structures (definition 3) and observable objects (def-
inition 5).
5 The Content of Scientific Theories
With a non-trivial concept of ‘abstract structure’ at hand, it is now possible to
provide an account of the content of scientific theories such that structural cor-
rectness of theories “is the strongest epistemic claim about them that it is reason-
able to make” (Worrall 2007, 125).
5.1 A Semantic Approach
In the semantic view, “[t]o present a theory is to specify a family of structures,
its models” (van Fraassen 1980, 64). The models of a theory are for example
specified using what is often called a ‘Suppes predicate’, a set theoretic description
of the conditions that the models of the theory satisfy. With the full content of
a theory presented by specifying its class of models,7 the structural content of
that theory is then presented by specifying the class of abstract structures (the
theory’s abstract models) that its models represent. In other words, to discard the
non-structural content of a theory, it suffices to close the class of its models under
6. A substructure is a special case of a relativized reduct with T =∅.
7. The distinction between family and class is irrelevant for my, and van Fraassen’s, discussion.
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isomorphism. Thus if T is the class of the theory’s models, then its structural
content is given by the class
A : For someB ∈ T, A is isomorphic toB	 . (12)
As a shorthand, one can say that the content of a theory according to complete
sr is given as the class of its abstract models.
In theoretical sr it is assumed that theories have not only structural content,
since observable objects and their observational properties can also be known.
To arrive at the content of a scientific theory according to theoretical sr, then,
the class T of models of the theory only has to be expanded to include those
structures that are isomorphic to models of the theory while retaining their ob-
servable objects and observational properties. More precisely, if T is the class of
the theory’s models, then its content according to theoretical sr is given by the
class
A : For someB ∈ T, A is isomorphic toB and A|OO =B|OO
	
. (13)
5.2 A Syntactic Approach
Ladyman (1998, §3.1) lays the failure of the Ramsey sentence as an explication
of ‘structure*’ to the feet of syntactic approaches, which describe scientific the-
ories by sets of interpreted sentences in predicate logic. French and Saatsi (2006,
552) even imply that structuralism is incompatible with any syntactic approach
when they reject the use of predicate logic in semantic approaches because “the
deployment of linguistic formulations [would] strike to the structuralist heart of
the semantic approach”. Thus it may look like a fool’s errand to try expressing
the structural content of theories within a syntactic approach. However, it has
been shown in some detail that structures (and hence abstract structures) require
a language of predicate logic to be expressive enough for the formalization of sci-
entific theories (Halvorson 2012, 2013, 2016; Glymour 2013; Lutz 2014b, forth-
coming; Krause and Arenhart 2017).8 Thus if the use of the language of predicate
logic were to preclude syntactic approaches from expressing abstract structures,
it would just as much preclude semantic approaches. But, in the contrapositive,
since semantic approaches can express abstract structures, so can syntactic ones.
Indeed, the content of a theory according to complete sr can be expressed
particularly straightforwardly in a syntactic approach due to a feature of standard
predicate logic described briefly above and more eloquently by Beth (1963, 479–
80, footnote removed):
[N]atural language can be used in two different ways, which I should
like to denote as strict usage and amplified usage, respectively. In strict
usage of natural language, we refer to a definite model of the theory
8. Incidentally, the higher order formula ϑ∗ described in footnote 2 is the syntactic analogue of
the Suppes predicate for ϑ.
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to which our statements belong; it is this model which has been
called the intuitive model. In amplified usage of natural language—
and in all usage of formalised languages—on the other hand, we refer
to any model of this theory.
What Beth calls the ‘intuitive model’ I have called the ‘intended structure’ above.
So Beth’s point is that formal languages, and thus specifically any language of
predicate logic, are usually assumed to be used amplified, that is, without an
intended structure. Without an intended structure, a set of sentences of predicate
logic can determine its models at the most up to isomorphism, that is, at the most
up to abstract structures; thus without an intended structure, predicate logic can
express only the structural content of a theory. Assuming now that the set Θ of
sentences can express the class T of models of a theory up to isomorphism, the
theory’s structural content is given by the class
A :A Θ	 . (14)
The following holds trivially:
Claim 13. If the set Θ of sentences expresses the class T of models of a theory up to
isomorphism, then the content of the theory according to complete sr in semantic
approaches (12) is identical to that in syntactic approaches (14).
Thus the content of Θ consists of abstract structures and corollary 9 applies.
Incidentally, Putnam (1989, 353) relies on corollary 9 as well (albeit restricted
to exchanges of objects in the same domain) when discussing his famous model
theoretic argument against realism (Putnam 1977) and concluding:9
[I]f there is such a thing as ‘an ideal theory’ [I ], then that theory
can never implicitly define its own intended reference relation. In
fact, there are always many different reference relations that make
I true, if I is a consistent theory which postulates the existence of
more than one object.
The preceding discussion has thus established that sr embraces Putnam’s argu-
ment and provides a means of retaining some realistic interpretation of theories
in spite of it.
One may object to all of this with van Fraassen (1989, 211, n. 31), who notes
that first order predicate logic cannot describe all classes of structures up to iso-
morphism, so that the syntactic description of abstract structures would reduce
the expressiveness of sr. This objection fails, however, because nothing in my
defense of the explication of ‘structure*’ by ‘abstract structure’ assumes a restric-
tion to first order logic.10 Indeed, it is very plausible that if a scientific theory can
9. It should be noted that Winnie (1967) and Przełęcki (1969, 24–31; 1974, 405) already made
the very same point.
10. Demopoulos and Friedman’s criticism of the Ramsey sentence approach assumes that the
theory is given in first order logic, but my criticism does not.
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be described by a class of structures, that class of structures can also be described
by sets of sentences of higher order predicate logic (Lutz 2014b, §2).
The content of a theory according to theoretical sr is fixed beyond isomor-
phism, which requires, in Beth’s terminology, a strict language for predicate logic.
And as Beth (1963, 481) puts it: “It would be quite possible to introduce a special
formalised language for strict usage in addition to the various formalised lan-
guages already in existence.” He adds in a footnote: “It is, of course, possible
to resort to other devices to obtain the same practical effect”. A specialized for-
mal language could, for instance, identify strictly interpreted terms with a dot.
This allows expressing the content of a theory Θ according to structural sr as
Θ(O˙1, . . . , O˙m ,T1, . . . ,Tn), where the terms O1, . . . ,Om have a strict interpreta-
tion and the terms T1, . . . ,Tn have an amplified one. This approach achieves what
the use of the Ramsey sentence was meant to achieve: The interpretation of the
observational terms is fixed while for the theoretical terms only the structural
relations are retained. But this approach fixes the interpretation of observation
terms even for unobservable objects, and this is incompatible with epistemic sr,
which restricts the fixed interpretation to observable objects. To achieve this re-
striction, one needs to resort to other devices, namely intended structures and
relativized reducts.
The domains of intended structures I according to esr contain only observ-
able objects, and they interpret only observational terms O . Assuming again
that the set Θ of sentences expresses the class T of models of a theory up to iso-
morphism, the theory’s content is then given by those models of Θ that respect
the intended structures. More precisely, the theory’s content according to esr is
given by the class 
A :A Θ and A|OO ∈ I
	
. (15)
In a semantic approach, the class I of intended structures is uniquely determined
by the class of models of the theory: I =

I : I = A|OO for some A ∈ T
	
. The
following holds:
Claim 14. If the set Θ of sentences expresses the class T of models of a theory up to
isomorphism and I=

I : I=A|OO for some A ∈ T
	
, then the content of the theory
according to theoretical sr in semantic approaches (13) is identical to that in syntactic
approaches (15).
Proof. Assume that C ∈ A : For someB ∈ T, A is isomorphic toB and A|OO
=B|OO
	
. This holds iff C Θ and A|OO = C|OO for some A ∈ T, which holds
iff C Θ and C|OO ∈ I and thus iff C ∈

A :A Θ and A|OO ∈ I
	
.
Incidentally, the content (15) of the theory according to theoretical sr is the
same as one developed by Marian Przełęcki (1969, ch. 6; 1973, 287) for the seman-
tics of theories according to the received view on scientific theories of the logical
empiricists.
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6 Ruminations on Structural Realism
The bijection lemma at the core of Newman’s objection and sr is so general that
the connection between sr and the semantics of logical empiricism is far from
the only one. For instance, the bijection lemma is also at the core of one of
Quine’s arguments for the inscrutability of reference (Quine 1981, 19). Davidson
(1979, 9), like Putnam, restricts his discussion of the inscrutability of reference
to permutations rather than bijections. Winnie (1967), relying on unrestricted
bijections, anticipates Putnam’s model theoretic argument against realism. Since
these arguments rely on the bijection lemma, however, they can only be used
to criticize realism, not sr. Rather, like Newman’s objection, they express the
irrelevance of objects in scientific theories.
Importantly, the central role of the bijection lemma in Quine’s and David-
son’s arguments implies that Quine’s and Davidson’s accounts of language can
also be used for sr, and specifically for complete sr, since they do not allow for
any fixed reference whatsoever. So there is no particular need to worry, for in-
stance, about complete sr being unrelated to the world, seeing that Quine’s and
Davidson’s accounts of language seem to allow for substantial statements about
the world. Russell (1919, 61), after presenting what is essentially corollary 9, puts
the matter as follows when discussing the relation between worlds with identical
abstract structure:
In short, every proposition having a communicable significance
must be true of both worlds or of neither: the only difference must
lie in just that essence of individuality which always eludes words
and baﬄes description, but which, for that very reason, is irrelevant
to science.
However, complete sr makes no distinction between the observable and the
unobservable world, which may worry empiricists. In theoretical sr, there is
no such worry: The extensions of observational terms are fixed for observable
objects, and the relations between the extensions of the theoretical terms are
only determined up to isomorphism (unless the extensions contain observable
objects). In complete sr, on the other hand, the relations between the extensions
of all terms are determined only up to isomorphism. To retain the assumption of
complete sr, any distinction between observational and theoretical terms there-
fore must not lead to a distinction between isomorphic structures and thus must
not distinguish specific extensions.
Since observational and theoretical terms cannot be distinguished by way of
extensions, it may be that the distinction can only be made on the level of the
properties that the terms name. This would mean that there are some properties
to which we have direct access through our perception, and some properties to
which we have access only through their relations to each other and to the prop-
erties to which we have perceptual access. This requires an account of perception
19
Sebastian Lutz Newman’s Objection is Dead; Long Live Newman’s Objection!—Preprint
that does not rely on the existence of objects, an account like the adverbial theory
of perception.11
In the adverbial theory of perception, “whenever a sensory quality appears
to be instantiated then it is instantiated [and] we should think of these qualities
as modifications of the experience itself” (Crane and French 2017, §3.2.1). A stan-
dard example is that rather than thinking of perceiving a red and square object,
one should think of perceiving redly and squarely. (If one is less purist about the
proper phrasing, one may also think of perceiving in a red and square manner (cf.
Tye 1975, 138). I will often be less purist in the following.) The experience being
modified is, of course, that of some observer, but as is typical in the discussion in
the philosophy of science, I will abstract from any specific observer. I will also
ignore many subtleties of (the different versions of) the adverbial theory; what is
important here is only that there are adverbial theories that are compatible with
the description of the world in abstract structures. Indeed, the approach of the ad-
verbial theory can for my purposes also be applied to, for instance, measurement
results: Just as one can perceive brownly, one can measure “3◦C-ly” or, some-
what more gracefully, in a 3◦C manner: Just as the sensory quality modifies the
experience, so the measured value modifies the measurement. An empiricist com-
plete sr thus can rely on the adverbial theory of perception (possibly extended
to an adverbial theory of measurement or the like) for observational terms while
continuing to rely on Davidson’s semantics for theoretical terms.
But it is not only that the adverbial theory of perception provides a coherent
way for complete sr being empiricist. Complete sr also provides a coherent way
of responding to some of the criticisms of the adverbial theory of perception.
For many of the criticisms allege that some description of perceptions or another
cannot be expressed within the conceptual apparatus of the adverbial theory. But,
as Russell pointed out, “every proposition having a communicable significance”
can be expressed in abstract structures alone. This is exemplified very clearly in
the discussion of the many-properties problem (Jackson 1975, 129). According
to this criticism of the adverbial theory, “we must be able to distinguish the
statements: ‘I have a red and a square after-image’, and ‘I have a red, square after-
image’”, where the adverbial theory “does not appear to be able to do this” (130).
Jackson comes to this conclusion by in effect assuming that the adverbial theory
simply assigns a class of perceived properties to each moment of perception. But
if the adverbial theory allows assigning an abstract structure to each moment
of perception, the many-properties problem disappears: When I have a red and
a square after-image, this can be described by the abstract structure represented
by ‘〈{1,2},{1},{2}〉’ (assuming the second element of the tuple stands for ‘red’
and the third stands for ‘square’), and when I have a red, square after-image,
this can be described by the abstract structure represented by ‘〈{1},{1},{1}〉’.
11. The most prominent competitors of the adverbial theory of perception assume direct per-
ceptual access to objects: Both the naive realist theory and the intentionalist theory assume direct
access to physical phenomena, and the sense datum theory assumes direct access to sense data (see
Crane and French 2017, §3).
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Sellars (1975, 151) makes this very point when he suggests that one can phrase
the distinction as one between ‘sensing in an of-a-red-object manner and in an
of-a-square-object manner’ and ‘sensing in an of-a-red-and-square-object manner’.
This description is actually very close to the way abstract structures are described
by way of equivalence classes: Objects are used as dummy variables to relate the
different properties in complex ways, but commitment to the objects’ existence
is denied—in Sellars’ case by the adverbial construction, in the case of abstract
structures by using equivalence classes of isomorphic structures.
With theoretical sr being empiricist by design and complete sr allowing for
an empiricist version, the realism debate comes again into view: Abstract struc-
tures provide a means of describing a non-trivial sr, but being non-trivial is not
the same as being true. Indeed, with a precise account of sr at hand, it is clear
that the sr debate might have the same structure as the realism debate: While real-
ists must defend the existence of theoretical entities and their theoretical proper-
ties, structural realists must defend the existence of theoretical properties. They
could, for instance, try to establish that without the existence of the theoreti-
cal properties postulated in our best theories, the theories’ success would be a
miracle. Conversely, structural anti-realists could find examples of empirically
unsuccessful theories that postulate properties which we now consider to exist,
and examples of empirically successful theories that postulate properties which
we now do not consider to exist.
7 Conclusion
Even though the debate about sr may become as protracted as the debate about
realism, the definition of the different versions of sr in terms of abstract struc-
tures can be progress: The resulting sr is not trivial, and Newman’s objection
provides a pithy reformulation of its central idea. And in spite of the failure of
the definition of sr in terms of Ramsey sentences, sr can be expressed very nat-
urally and compactly in a syntactic way. Indeed, esr finds its natural expression
in the semantics of theories given by the logical empiricists. Furthermore, the
central role of the bijection lemma in sr and a number of other philosophical po-
sitions highlights the possibilities for combining srwith, for instance, Davidson’s
semantics. And combining sr with the adverbial theory of perception not only
provides responses to some popular criticisms of the adverbial theory, but also
allows for a completely structural but still empiricist description of the world.
This still does not make sr a perfect example of a philosophical synthesis, but
it’s not too bad either.
A Epilogue: Where Things Went Awry
The Ramsey sentence explication of sr is implausible, as I hope to have made
clear. Newman may be considered one source of this unfortunate explication.
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But Demopoulos and Friedman (1985, 622) provide another source:
As Grover Maxwell emphasized, it is possible to extract from [Rus-
sell’s Analysis of Matter] a theory of theories that anticipates in sev-
eral respects the Ramsey-sentence reconstruction of physical theo-
ries articulated by Carnap and others many decades later.
In one of the two papers they refer to, Maxwell (1970, 185) discusses model the-
ory as follows:
Consider for example the function
∀x∀y[(Sx ∧ Sy)→ (Rxy→¬Ryx)] (f)
where ‘S’ and ‘R’ are free predicate variables. If ‘S’ is replaced by a
predicate [‘M ’ and] ‘R’ by [‘O’ such that] a true proposition is ob-
tained[, then] the ordered set (M ,O), satisfies (f) and, consequently,
is a model of (f).
Note that Maxwell assumes that variables are interpreted by the structure (cf.
Mates 1972, 59–60), not some variable assignment or similar.12 Thus a minimal
model for (f) has the form 〈dom (A) , SA,RA〉. Maxwell (1970, 185) then defines a
“mixed function” as containing both free (higher order) variables ψ,ϕ and non-
logical constants C ,D (“descriptive terms”) and defines a “common model” as
“a model of a mixed function in which the descriptive terms retain their original
meaning”. With this terminology, Maxwell (1970, 186–187, my notation) states:
To assert that
∀x ψx ∧ϕx→∃yC y (i)
has at least one common model is equivalent to asserting the propo-
sition
∃ψ∃ϕ∀x ψx ∧ϕx→∃yC y . ( j)
As is well known, (j) is the Ramsey sentence of the little ‘theory’
∀x Ax ∧Dx→∃yC y . (k)
Maxwell (1970, 188) then suggests that the Ramsey sentence “may be taken as an
explication of the claim of Russell and others that our knowledge of the theoret-
ical is limited to its purely structural characteristics”.
For Maxwell, the step from (k) to (i) corresponds almost exactly to the move
from a single intended model of a structure in which all terms are uniquely in-
terpreted to set of structures according to (15) if one assumes that an object is
12. He also does not distinguish between constants in the object language and their extensions,
which will become important in a bit.
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observable if and only if it is in the extension of an observational term. For C re-
tains its intended interpretation, whereas the intended interpretation of A and D
is replaced by any interpretation in which (k) remains true.13 Thus for Maxwell,
(i) has minimal model 〈dom (A) ,ψA,ϕA,CA〉. The equivalence (for Maxwell)
of asserting a common model for (i) and asserting (j) becomes plausible when
considering the second paper referred to by Demopoulos and Friedman. Here,
Maxwell (1968, 153) argues that
the only aspects of the nonmental world of which we can have any
knowledge or any conception are purely structural (or, in other
words, purely formal).
As an example, Maxwell (1968, 154) describes a formal property F
such that any system having the property consists of some set of
entities and some relation which is asymmetric and transitive within
the set. In other words: A system, U , has the formal property, F
=def ∃S∃R
 
U = 〈S,R〉 and for any x, y, and z in S (Rxy →
¬Ryx) and (Rxy ∧Ryz→ Rxz)	.14
This suggests that Maxwell uses existential quantification in the metalanguage
of model theory interchangeably with existential quantification in the objection
language, which justifies the move from (i) to (j). But of course, what Maxwell is
giving here is not the Newman sentence of the theory ‘∀xyz(Rxy →¬Ryx)∧
(Rxy∧Ryz→ Rxz)’ in our current understanding, but rather a description of a
structure up to isomorphism. Thus, while in Maxwell’s understanding it makes
sense to speak of the Ramsey sentence as expressing the theoretical structure of
a theory, in our current formalism it does not.
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